

Message Text

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14-11

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SAM-01 SAJ-01 INR-05 DODE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1004

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 1605

LIMDIS

GENEVA FOR CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, DA, US, CSCE

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER

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1. I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER K B ANDERSEN TO GAIN HIS

APPRECIATION OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ANKER JORGENSEN AT THE RECENT NATO SUMMIT. I ALSO WANTED TO GET DANISH REACTIONS TO JORGENSEN'S MEETING WITH PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES AND TO ANDERSEN'S PRE-SUMMIT DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

2. ANDERSEN SAID THAT THE DANES COULDN'T HAVE BEEN MORE SATISFIED BY THE WAY THE SUMMIT AS A WHOLE WENT AND IN PARTICULAR JORGENSEN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. IF THE MAJOR PURPOSES BEHIND THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN BRUSSELS WERE TO MUTUALLY REAFFIRM DEDICATION TO THE ALLIANCE AND THE FAITH OF EUROPE IN THE US COMMITMENT, THESE WERE COMPELETLY ACHIEVED.

3. ANDERSEN SAID THAT THE DANES WERE MOVED BY THE WARMTH WITH WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD RECEIVED THEM, AND CONFIDED THAT JORGENSEN TOLD THE DANISH PARLIAMENT'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD BEEN MOST IMPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMAND OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN BRUSSELS AS WELL AS HIS CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY. JORGENSEN HAD BEEN HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE PRESIDENT OF THE DANISH DECISION TO BUY THE F-16, AND THE PRESIDENT SEEMED PLEASED BY JORGENSEN'S EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR THE WAY THE US HAD CONDUCTED ITSELF DURING THE FIGHTER PLANE COMPETITION.

4. ANDERSEN SAID THAT HE HAD HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE SEVERAL SATISFYING EXCHANGES OF CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY. ANDERSEN ASSURED THE SECRETARY OF DANISH WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO SPAIN TO HELP IT THROUGH ITS TRANSITION BUT REITERATED THE REASONS FOR THE PRESENT DANISH POSITION VIS-A-VIS SPAIN AND NATO.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE JORGENSEN MEETING WITH GONCALVES, ANDERSEN DIVIDED HIS IMPRESSIONS IN TWO PARTS. HE FOUND CONCALVES' PRESENTATION ON PORTUGUESE FOREIGN POLICY REASONABLE. THE DANES ACCEPTED HIS EXPRESSION OF PORTUGUESE INTENTIONS TO REMAIN A DEPENDABLE NATO ALLY. ANDERSEN REMARKED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT MOST OF THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY DO NOT WANT TO SEE THEIR COUNTRY UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL BUT THAT THEY ARE IN AN AWKWARD AND DELICATE POSITION. ANDERSEN
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THINKS THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TREAT PORTUGAL GINGERLY AND AVOID ANY ACTIONS THAT EXTREME ELEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY COULD SEIZE ON TO FORCE THE COUNTRY TO SEPARATE FROM NATO. GONCALVES, WHO TALKED AT GREAT LENGTH AND RATHER DISJOINTEDLY, WAS MUCH LESS CONVINCING AT DESCRIBING THE INTERNAL POLICY SITUATION. GONCAVLES, HOWEVER, DID AFFIRM THAT HE WISHES HIS COUNTRY TO DEVELOP INTO A PLURALISTIC DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

6. I PUSHED ANDERSEN SOMEWHAT IN ATTEMPTING TO GET HIS PERSONAL APPRAISAL OF GONCALVES TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE DANES BELIEVED WE COULD TRUST GONCALVES HIMSELF. ANDERSEN REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT GONCALVES WAS PROBABLY WORTHY OF SUCH TRUST BUT THAT WE SHOULD BEWARE OF SOME OF HIS ADVISERS.

(COMMENT: I BELIEVE THE DANES ARE NAIVE OVER THE DANGERS COMMUNISM POSES IN PORTUGAL EITHER IN OR OUT OF NATO. ANDERSEN ALSO APPEARS TO REGARD GONCALVES MORE FAVORABLY THAN HAVE MOST OTHER INTERLOCUTORS.)

7. ANDERSEN WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO IN MOSCOW JUST BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. ANDERSEN CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD FOCUSED ON CSCE QUESTIONS AND THAT HE HAD CONVEYED TO GROMYKO THE EC NINE CONSENSUS THAT SIGNIFICANT SOVIET CONCESSIONS HAD TO BE MADE IN ORDER TO HOLD A SUMMIT IN JULY IN HELSINKI. GROMYKO WAS CORDIAL BUT BRUSHED ASIDE AS UNIMPORTANT THE OBJECTIONS OF THE NINE TO PRESENT RUSSIAN POSITIONS ON BASKET III AND CBMS.

8. IN RESPONSE TO SUBSEQUENT SOUNDINGS BY OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS SEEKING ANDERSEN'S CONCLUSIONS AFTER HIS MAIN TALK WITH GROMYKO, ANDERSEN REPLIED THAT A JULY SUMMIT APPEARED IMPOSSIBLE. ANDERSEN SAID THIS JUDGMENT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY PASSED TO GROMYKO WHO DURING A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION REITERATED FORCEFULLY TO ANDERSEN SEVERAL TIMES THAT THERE WILL REPEAT WILL BE SUCH A SUMMIT. ANDERSEN SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER GROMYKO THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE FAILURE OF WESTERN WILL OR BY SOVIET CONCESSIONS.

9. I ASKED ANDERSEN WHAT THE DANES WERE GOING TO DO WITH THE LAST OFFER BY THE SWEDES ON THE VIGGEN. ANDERSEN SAID THAT IT HAD SIMPLY COME TOO LATE AND HAD SUCCEEDED IN ANTAGONIZING BOTH BY OPPONENTS AND PROPONENTS OF THE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT. WITHOUT GOING FURTHER INTO DETAIL, ANDERSEN SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE SWEDISH OFFER WAS PROMPTED SOLELY BY SWEDISH INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL "GIVE US SOME TROUBLE", ANDERSEN WAS CONVINCED THAT THE DANES WOULD PROCEED WITH THEIR INTENTION TO BUY THE F-16. ANDERSEN SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD ASKED DEFENSE MINISTER MOLLER WHETHER HE WANTED ANDERSEN'S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ON THIS QUESTION, IT HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN AS UNNECESSARY. ANDERSEN SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE DANISH GOVT HAD PLAYED THE AIRCRAFT PURCHASE PROPERLY IN TREATING IT AS A NON-POLITICAL MATTER TO BE RESOLVED SOLELY ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

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10. ANDERSEN WAS IN FINE FETTER PERSONALLY AND GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A FOREIGN MINISTER WHO IS REALLY ON TOP OF HIS

JOB. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT AGREE WITH HIM ON ALL MATTERS, I THINK
HE IS AN HONORABLE AND CAPABLE PERSON.
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